Dear Fellow Antipodes Observers,
I don’t know from submarines. The industry, technology, and people are all very interesting, but I only cover aero systems. Yet the AUKUS SSN announcement this month has implications and lessons for the aero world. Here are two commentaries, one advertisement, and one caveat.
(1) Commentary: the bigger the weapons deal, the more you’re buying a strategic relationship, and there are big implications for other sales to the region. Deal size isn’t always correlated with politics; Denmark, with its small 28 F-35 buy, also expects that deal to help preserve its standing in NATO, and the US’s commitment to NATO. Yet most small deals are more about value (Switzerland’s F-35 plan, for example, or any Thai fighter purchase). But bigger deals like AUKUS subs ($90 billion!) are less about selecting the right equipment at the right price, and more about buying a strategic relationship. Similarly, every large fighter purchase by an Arab Gulf state is more about a strategic relationship. So, given the rise of China, and the US’s role in managing that, the Australia SSN deal is 99% about a strategic relationship.
This brings us to France. At first, observers blamed the Macron Government’s anger on the economic implications of losing their submarine deal to Australia (which France originally won, by the way, by aggressively edging out Japan). But increasingly, the view is that this loss reflects a reality that’s rather difficult for France: they’re simply less relevant in the Pacific, and as a world power outside of Europe, than the US. The NY Times alone has four slightly duplicative but excellent columns on this painful reality here, here, here, and here.
France, like the US, benefits immensely when it couples arms sales with strategic relationships – this was a big factor in its Rafale sales to Greece and Egypt, coupled as they were with France’s eastern Mediterranean presence and operations. But while France is a notable power in the Pacific, it’s nowhere near the US’s level of power. And the UK’s Pacific presence is magnified by US support – HMS Queen Elizabeth’s air wing was 50% USMC F-35Bs. When France deployed a carrier there, it mattered less because France simply doesn’t have that close relationship. The Charles de Gaulle deploying with US fighters? Mais non.
The upshot of this is that from an arms export perspective, the Pacific will become even more of a captive US market. Once, the RAAF bought Dassault Mirage IIIs. That’s not going to happen in the new environment. Ditto for those Mirage 2000s Taiwan once bought. Australia bought Tiger attack helicopters; it will soon swap them for AH-64Es. There may be some room in Asia/Pacific markets for home-grown (but US-equipped), systems, such as the Ching Kuo or KF-21, and Britain may get a few prizes here and there, but for the most part Pacific customers will increasingly buy American. It’s all about the strategic relationship, and countering China.
(2) Commentary: Air power isn’t the only form of power projection. The SSN announcement was kind of a surprise to me, and to others. Consider Australia’s situation: they’re thousands of miles of ocean and islands from their only big threat, but not too far from that threat for some degree of comfort (as the US enjoys, with the entire Pacific). Australia was the only F-111 export customer for a reason. There were once rumors of an RAAF bomber acquisition (used B-1s were once on offer, and some speculated about B-21 interest). The country recently began an ambitious hypersonic missiles plan, and a broader missiles development scheme; they’ve also started an equally ambitious loyal wingman program (Airpower Teaming System).
But now, $90 billion is going to SSNs. That’s $90 billion that isn’t going to bombers, hypersonics, loyal wingman, or more EA-18Gs or F-35As. The US can pull off massive spending on a mix of power projection systems, from SSNs to CVNs to B-21s; for smaller, regional powers like Australia, there are tough tradeoff decisions to be made.
And now, (3) a word on behalf of air power. SSNs are impressive as a strategic tool. The AUKUS technology transfer agreement and spending commitment alone serve as a powerful deterrent. But the SSNs themselves won’t be deployable weapons until after 2035, and China is generally viewed as a shorter-term problem, particularly regarding Taiwan. As Byron Callan of Capital Alpha put it an investors’ note, “If eight submarines won’t be fully operational until, say 2038, will that really matter to the strategic balance in the Western Pacific?” Spending this kind of money on aircraft – even, say, B-21s – would get something fielded, and relevant, way before then.
Also, SSNs are excellent at dealing with the China problem (for a strong defense of the AUKUS SSNs, see Andrew Erickson’s piece in Foreign Policy; Vago Muradian has a superb piece too at his DefAero report). But SSNs are less flexible assets than aviation. Imagine a scenario, 15 years from now, where China has returned to what it was, well, 15 years ago: a growing country, with a strong economy and a modernizing military, but with no interest in kicking around its neighbors (or its national minorities). Or imagine any scenario, where, for whatever reason, China just isn’t that big a problem for the West. In that future, Australia’s military would revert to its historical missions: coalition warfighting, regional security, and general sovereignty operations. Air power would still be relevant for all of these contingencies, providing air patrol, surveillance, and if needed a measured application of force, all at a reasonable cost. SSNs, by contrast, would be extremely expensive for what they would provide.
This brings us to (4), A Caveat. Consider the story of Canada’s SSNs. When I was in graduate school for War Studies, our northern pals decided to build a fleet of SSNs (the imaginatively-named Canada class). It was about the same fleet, and the same expense, as Australia’s planned SSN force, and it had the same strategic objective: to counter a menacing adversary that was separated by several thousands of miles of water and island (and ice). The Canada SSN plan died, in part because the US didn’t transfer the technology (as it will to Australia). But if the Canada class didn’t die, imagine Canadian defense in the 1990s and 2000s: an enormous diversion of resources to build SSNs to counter…the Soviet Union. Canada’s military would have been ill-prepared for any other contingency.
In other words, this story could repeat itself with AUKUS. Again, air power might be the better choice.
Yours, ‘Til the RAAF Gets Avro Vulcans,
Richard Aboulafia