Dear Fellow Aero Program Trackers,
I don’t love surprises. Nobody who forecasts for a living does. And if I’ve had one easy call to make over the past ten years or so, it’s been NGAD. Rise of China + F-35 limitations + new technologies + truncated F-22 procurement = NGAD is a slam-dunk. Thus, the Air Force’s recent NGAD re-think – which sounds like those Soviet-era “Comrade X is very unwell” pre-death announcements – is an extremely unwelcome surprise.
More on that below. Since my faith in my forecasting judgement has been shaken, it’s time for a review of US military aircraft programs and plans. Here’s a two-page summary of ADA’s judgement, organized by service/requirement, with a confidence rating in what we’re thinking (1 = who the hell knows?; 10 = you can take this roadmap to the CNC tool finance people):
USAF Combat Aircraft
Lots of smart people have ideas on what’s going on with NGAD. Some blame astronomical unit prices. My friend JJ Gertler believes “They are taking a hiatus between the technology development phase and the acquisition phase to re-spec the airframe,” due to the need for more range. Bill Sweetman blames the “F-35 ominishambles” for budget pressure, and for making a hash of USAF plans. Sentinel overruns are an issue too. Others, like my friend, Defense & Aerospace Report Editor Vago Muradian, see a potentially tectonic shift to more platform-agnostic technologies, particularly with Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs). Some blame the sourcing choice from hell – with Northrop out, it was Boeing V. Lockheed, meaning death by stabbing or death by poison. The first might not be able to execute, and the second has little reason to execute.
ADA Forecast: NGAD survives, but as a somewhat different jet, with EIS in the late 2030s or 2040 and with a high risk of sudden death. CCAs continue, but don’t expect the skies to darken with them imminently, since the operating systems, basing/launching solutions, and overall architecture won’t be in place for another ten years, at least. The F-35A stays on autopilot at 50-60 per year. The B-21 looks very solid and might even benefit from NGAD’s limbo/hiatus/death. The F-15EX program grows a bit. There’s a chance of an F-16 procurement re-start, too.
Confidence rating: 4/10.
USAF Everything Else
Plenty to worry about. Aging C-5Ms and heavily used C-17s mean that C-X is the biggest unfunded requirement out there. Air Mobility Command chief Gen. Mike Minihan told Vago that a C-17 update (new or re-engine) is a great option, but USAF hopefully realizes that, unlike when the C-17 was created, none of the engine OEMs have a 40,000 lbst turbofan on the drawing board (or even an old one in production). The only other transport, the geriatric C-130, lives from hand-to-mouth. KC-46 lurches from one disappointment to the next, but KC-Y is dead, and plans for a stealthy KC-Z look fiscally malnourished. T-7 may or may not be in good shape. Oh, and E-7 Wedgetail is now recognized as a necessity, but contract delays continue.
ADA Forecast: Because of that looming engine problem, there’s no C-X (or even a C-17neo) until the 2040s. KC-46s@15/year for a very long time, with continued KC-Z research (hopefully more for JetZero’s BWB concept) but no procurement until the second half of the 2030s at least. The C-130J stays alive, somehow (but with KC-390 gaining traction abroad, no guarantees on that). T-7 works (also somehow), but plenty of risk. E-7 procurement starts in a few years. Again, somehow.
Confidence rating: 4/10.
USN Fighters
Status: Oh dear. They really don’t like the F-35C. They’re determined to let the Super Hornet line die in a few years. F/A-XX will be the first clean-sheet Navy jet without any USMC buy-in, which hurts numbers and funding. But, strangely, there’s less risk to F/A-XX than to NGAD: carrier size limitations will keep F/A-XX from being re-scoped into an F-111-sized beast, and, unlike the Air Force, they can count on Northrop Grumman to do the job. There’s also no risk of USN looking at CCAs with a large airborne controller, as the USAF might with the B-21.
ADA Forecast: Further F/A-XX delays, but IOC mid-2030s. No more Super Hornets, just major upgrades. The F-35C trickle continues. MQ-25 stays more or less on track, followed by a naval CCA at some point. That USN strike fighter shortfall from a few years ago? It’s been kicked down the road, to show up again in a few years.
Confidence rating: 6/10.
USMC Fighters
Status: Largely divorced from the blue water USN and doing fine. They got the F-35B, and their own carriers too, and avoided taking a single Super Hornet. Only concern: JSF happened once. The F-35B might be the last STOVL clean-sheet fighter. But the service’s aviation roadmap is fine through 2060, at least, with help from F-35Cs on big carriers.
ADA Forecast: F-35B (and C) procurement for many years. As straightforward as it gets.
Confidence rating: 9/10.
USMC Rotary
The CH-53K may be expensive, and may suffer from serious production-related delays, but it’s very safe since, well, since the Marines want it, period. Even better, they’ve off-loaded the tiltrotor RDT&E burden to the Army, so they can just buy V-280s when they want.
ADA Forecast: CH-53K program of record, with V-280 replacing the UH-1Y and ultimately many V-22s, starting in the 2030s.
Confidence rating: 8/10.
US Army
V-280 looks solid on many levels. FARA’s inevitable death frees up cash for everything else, although the scout mission remains a concern. Meanwhile, the Army is also developing a menagerie of special mission business jets, with no-nonsense names like HADES and ATHENA. Solid plan, except these jets seem to violate the Key West agreement with the Air Force.
ADA Forecast: V-280 success. UH-60 hums along, as do AH-64 and CH-47. The scout job is filled by drones, perhaps with an off-the-shelf helo. USAF looks the other way on those ISR jets.
Confidence rating: 8/10.
The biggest wild card with these confidence rankings is the election. Trump 2.0 could mean big cuts for systems designed for expeditionary warfare or allied defense. That’s a lot of these systems. Fun historical anecdote: The B-17 development program only survived the 1930s America First movement (Nazi-adjacent, rather than Putin-adjacent) because it was promoted as the “Flying Fortress,” designed to protect America’s coasts. Perhaps today’s program managers need some defensive-sounding nomenclature.
Yours, Til CCAs Get Their Own Service,
Richard Aboulafia