Dear Fellow Special Military Operation Scholars,
James Joyce got it right (per a character in Ulysses): “History…is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake.” That sums up where we are – myriad disasters from the last century haunt us, and shadow over today’s strategic missteps. As the US-Israel-Iran conflict continues, I think of three episodes that provide parallel experiences or precedents. Here they are, with the way they might be repeated today, and, if they are repeated, the consequences for our industry:
1. Suez, 1956. Two Western powers attack a Mideast country whose regime they despise, largely with air and naval power. Keeping a key waterway open for oil is a primary objective. The resulting chaos threatens to fracture the Western alliance and exposes the limits of great power interventionism. It also tells one of those Western countries unpleasant truths about their ability to unilaterally project power, and about the economic costs of throwing their weight around. Other than all that, there are no similarities between Suez 1956 and Iran 2026.
How it would play out: To stave off economic damage (and serious midterm election losses), President Trump withdraws US forces, and reigns in Israel, in exchange for Iran ceasing fire and re-opening the Strait of Hormuz. As critics say, classic TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out). Predictably, Egypt was radicalized after ’56, aligning with the Soviets and becoming a bigger problem for everyone, particularly Israel; the same would happen with Iran today. Iran would gain with the realization that they hold a stronger hand, and accelerate nuclear weapons development too.
The recent National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy documents, written by MAGA types not named Donald J. Trump, call for avoiding the “forever wars” “that bogged us down in that region at great cost.” The people who wrote those would prevail, and Trump would blame anyone else (Rubio, Hegseth, Israel, etc.). I’ll let Jonathan Chait in The Atlantic summarize: “If the Iran war goes badly, the isolationist, anti-Israel wing of the party is likely to steer the GOP’s future….The traditional security hawks would be discredited, and the populist anti-interventionists vindicated.” China would be the big winner, as the US further disengages from allies around the world and hopes for the mythical US pivot to Asia completely vanish,
Industry impact: MAGA isolationists (led by JD Vance) don’t have the same fondness for defense spending as Trump, and certainly don’t like anything for expeditionary warfare. US defense spending would likely decline. Carrier aviation, particularly the F/A-XX, and tactical aviation in general wouldn’t fare well. Nor would strategic airlifters, tankers, or deployable surveillance systems like the E-7. I wouldn’t count on the Democrats to rescue defense or expeditionary systems, either. Commercial aero markets, however, would probably resume as before, with even the Gulf superconnectors recovering to their previous state.
2. Dien Bien Phu, 1954. A large French military force landed in a remote Vietnamese valley near Laos, thinking it’s a great place to fight a battle. Over six months, they were cut off, crushed, and forced to surrender after suffering heavy casualties. This battle effectively ended many years of French rule in Vietnam. Two great books on this: Bernard Fall’s Hell In A Very Small Place and Martin Windrow’s The Last Valley.
How it would play out: The US is sending expeditionary ground forces – Marines and airborne – but in relatively small numbers (<10,000 deployable troops). Since the size of this force rules out a serious mainland attack, the deployments are either performative or are intended for an attack on Kharg or other islands, The objective would be to seize oil facilities, and/or force Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. But these islands are within a few miles of mainland Iran and easily attacked by drones and missiles. Military professionals know it’s a bad idea, but there’s a reluctance in the top levels of DoD leadership to tell President Trump what he doesn’t want to hear. Hell in a very small place indeed, and perhaps a US defeat. If Iran is left able to control the Strait of Hormuz or the ability to shut down oil production facilities with drone or missile attacks, then the US has been defeated whether Iran continues to have a strong military or not.
Industry impact: Likely the same as Suez: a TACO moment, but a messier one. Alternatively, a lost battle could lead to a bigger war, and a US decision to go all-in (likely a “forever war”). Other regional players would be dragged in too, including the Gulf States and the Houthis. All this would be great for defense (US defense primes, but European too, and emerging export players such as South Korea). But this war would be very bad for commercial aviation.
One other historical note: past US debacles in the region served as catalysts for new weapons developments. In particular, the failed Desert One/Eagle Claw Iranian hostage rescue led to the development of the Bell/Boeing V-22 for the USMC and SOCOM.
3. Libya/Lockerbie 1986/1988. The US bombed key targets in Libya, in retaliation for the Qaddafi regime’s attacks on US military targets in Europe and following previous US-Libya altercations (the original Top Gun movie was inspired by a US-Libya air battle in 1981). The regime bided its time, then two years later got revenge by destroying a Pan Am 747 over Scotland, killing 270 civilians. Qaddafi lasted another 23 years.
How it would play out: Iran would seem to back down, but a further radicalized regime would bide its time, and then, after US forces withdrew, do something horrible (with some degree of plausible deniability), either with traditional terrorism or the cyber kind. The US would be faced with exactly the choice it faced in 1988: a much bigger escalation or just letting it blow over. The temptation to let it blow over will be strong because another Iranian disruption of oil supplies would have serious domestic consequences for any US administration.
Industry impact: While tragic, terrorist attacks don’t impact airline traffic and jetliner demand. Again, there could be implications for Iranian airspace access, and therefore for Gulf superconnector market shares (and jet orders). As for defense, there would be no real change, unless the US decided to repeat what it’s doing now, with equally uncertain goals.
There are other possible scenarios. But almost all of them, including the three above, result in one of two outcomes: Forever War (bad for commercial aero, great for defense) or TACO (fine for commercial aero, probably not good for defense). No outcomes are particularly happy. That’s why successive US administrations over the past 46 years didn’t strike Iran despite numerous provocations.
Yours, ‘Til History Stops Rhyming,
Richard Aboulafia